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In some quarters, it is becoming accepted wisdom that 
autism is not coherent as a syndrome. Instead of comprising 
a close-knit grouping of clinical features that regularly co-
occur, as many had thought, autism is ‘fractionable’ into 
relatively independent components. Sure enough, these 
components sometimes appear together, and when they do, 
affected individuals satisfy current diagnostic criteria for 
autism or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). But so, too, 
they often appear in isolation from one another. Evidence 
from family and twin studies might be taken to suggest that 
the components are distinct in heritability.
The alternative view is that far from being independent, 
the clinical features of autism are deeply interconnected. 
The connections do not have to be of one kind – for 
instance, two clinical features might reflect a common 
underlying dysfunction, or one might express a compensa-
tory adjustment in relation to the other – nor do they need 
to be so strong that the presence of one clinical feature 
implies that related features always co-occur. The argu-
ment for coherence rests on whether (a) the prevalence and 
(b) the qualities of any given form of behaviour may be 
influenced by pathogenic and pathoplastic factors that are 
either shared with, or arise directly from, other features of 
the syndrome.
The coherence view does not entail that one accepts a 
crude ‘thing’ version of autism. It is commonplace to forget 
that autism is neither more nor less than a syndrome, that is, 
a constellation of clinical features that tend to appear 
together (Kanner, 1943). For example, it is easy to fall into 
the trap of thinking that autism is a ‘central’ neurological 
disorder (Perez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden, 2005) or ‘is 
based on a disorder of information processing’ (Brambring, 
2011: 1596, my italics). Such a stance would need to be 
justified by empirical evidence that central brain-based or 
information-processing dysfunction plays a causative role 
in all cases of autism, and/or would imply that those with 
the syndrome who fail to fulfil certain criteria for neuro-
logical or information-processing dysfunction should not 
qualify for the diagnosis. One aim of this article is to give 
reasons why it would be inappropriate to redefine autism 
according to such criteria, even if they are applicable to 
many cases, just as it would be misguided to reconceptualise 
autism as a loose grouping of clinical features. Coherence in 
the clinically defined syndrome points to otherwise obscure 
continuities as well as discontinuities in typical as well as 
atypical mental development. It prompts us to explain how 
and why these particular features cluster together (to the 
extent that they do) and are mutually constituted (to the 
extent that they are).
What is to count as ‘Coherent’?
What is to count as ‘coherent’? Consider the issue of con-
sistency in the clinical picture. One option is to take the 
position that in order for a syndrome to be coherent as a 
syndrome, all the features that are said to characterise the 
syndrome need to be present in all or nearly all individuals 
who are to receive the diagnosis. Yet this is a very strict 
criterion. For example, in borderline personality disorder, 
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another psychiatric syndrome, individuals qualify for the 
diagnosis if they manifest a sufficient number of overlap-
ping clinical features that are diverse in quality. When pre-
sent, each of these features seems to be related to (and 
arguably, indirect expressions of) a central problem in the 
person’s intense and conflictual interpersonal relations. 
So, even though a given feature may not be present in any 
given individual with borderline personality disorder, there 
is something to be explained in accounting for its presence 
(when it is present) alongside other elements of the syn-
drome. It belongs in the family of features, as it were, even 
if it is not always present in a given family picture.
There is not a single way to construe coherence. From a 
diagnostic viewpoint, there are grounds for suggesting that 
the syndrome of autism is not sufficiently consistent in 
presentation to require that an individual shows repetitive 
and ritualistic behaviour (RRB; Mandy and Skuse, 2008). 
The danger would be that without further justification, this 
species of claim about incoherence might morph into 
another. Once the frame of reference alters – for instance, to 
a concern with the pathogenesis of RRBs when they do 
occur as part of the clinical picture – then one should not 
presume this is independent of other features of autism 
which might, for instance, predispose to or alter the expres-
sion of RRBs. A syndrome can be fractionable in one 
respect, yet coherent in another.
What is to count as ‘Explanation’?
One of the arguments for dividing up subgroupings of clini-
cal features pivots on whether separate explanatory 
accounts are required for each. It is in this context that 
Happé et al. (2006: 1218) suggest that it is ‘time to give up 
on a single explanation for autism’.
One meaning of ‘explain’ provided by the Oxford 
English Dictionary is ‘to unfold; to make plain or intelligi-
ble’. What would count as a single explanation for autism is 
far from clear. This might well be one that invokes different 
explanatory levels, with different causative factors on each 
level, while remaining an integrated whole. We should not 
demand nor expect that a given level of explanation should 
encompass everything about autism, nor that a single expla-
nation should be simple.
Consider an example from the psychological realm that 
is relevant for subsequent parts of this article. Wing and 
Wing (1971) suggested that autism might result from mul-
tiple perceptual and cognitive deficits. Such deficits would 
need not only explanation at lower levels (and Wing, 1969, 
studied a variety of perceptual handicaps with different 
causes), but also feed into an account of how those deficits 
lead to higher levels of dysfunction – perhaps, say, interfer-
ing with the development of executive function, or impov-
erishing the perception of people’s non-verbal 
communication. Then the question would arise, how far do 
these factors explain the clinical picture, or do we need 
further levels of explanation before the overall picture is 
‘unfolded’ and has become intelligible?
A further complexity is that sometimes, but not always, 
different levels of explanation implicate different kinds of 
explanation, for instance, genetic, biochemical, neurologi-
cal or psychological. In tracing the developmental psycho-
pathology of autism, we may need to shift between (say) 
neurologically and psychologically based accounts. At one 
stage in a child’s development, a given pattern of clinical 
features might reflect the several effects of a particular 
form of brain dysfunction, whereas at different stage, some 
part of the clinical profile (and some features of atypical 
brain activity) might be attributable to psychological 
impairments arising from restrictions in experience due to 
earlier perceptual, cognitive or social-affective deficits. We 
cannot presume which factors are in the driving seat nor 
which kind of explanation is needed to account for associa-
tions or dissociations among clinical features.
Finally, there are several criteria that may be applied 
when judging whether an explanation is basic to under-
standing autism. This depends on the question: ‘Basic for 
what?’ One view is that basic impairments are universally 
present in, and specific to, a condition. The picture is com-
plicated insofar as a basic psychological impairment may 
have a range of different (even more basic?) causes. From a 
complementary perspective, a factor that is not basic for 
autism as a whole may be necessary for providing an ade-
quate account of some essential part(s) of the condition.
Of course, we are concerned with how much a given 
account explains. For instance, to how many children with 
autism does it apply, how many of the clinical features does 
it encompass and how far does it provide coherent links 
between lower-order causes/levels (whether genetic, bio-
chemical, neurological or psychological in kind) and super-
ordinate levels of explanation? Beyond this, there is the 
further question of whether a particular account is neces-
sary to make the syndrome intelligible. Some levels of 
explanation may prove useful for a while, but become 
redundant when a better theory becomes available. Others 
are likely to prove indispensable.
The upshot is that even within a single theoretical 
account, there might be basic, coherence-inducing abnor-
malities at different levels of explanation. Special impor-
tance would attach to any abnormality that gives overall 
coherence to autism as a syndrome.
The case for radical incoherence
Background
Prompted by Wing’s (1969) study of different groups of 
handicapped children including those with language disor-
ders and severe perceptual abnormalities, Wing and Wing 
(1971) concluded that children with autism appear to suffer 
from multiple impairments that vary in severity, and postu-
lated that ‘a combination of language, perceptual, motor, 
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and autonomic impairments underlies autistic behavior’   
(p. 256). They stressed that this combination could have sin-
gle or multiple aetiology, that isolated fragments of the full 
clinical picture frequently occur, and that there is a need for 
‘detailed and systematic observation of behavior of autistic 
children’ (p. 256). Goodman (1989: 409) suggested that 
‘autism may involve multiple functional deficits due to multi-
ple coexistent neurological deficits’, perhaps involving defi-
cits in language skills, on the one hand, and in social 
relatedness, on the other. In more recent times, leading propo-
nents of the ‘fractionable’ view of autism have been Happé, 
Ronald, and colleagues, and from this point, I shall focus on 
these researchers’ comprehensive approach to the topic.
An article by Happé et al. (2006) begins with an abstract 
in which the authors write: ‘We argue that there will be no 
single (genetic or cognitive) cause for the diverse symp-
toms defining autism … At the cognitive level, too, attempts 
at a single explanation for the symptoms of autism have 
failed’ (p. 1218). Later on, they state that ‘it is time to give 
up on the search for a monolithic cause or explanation for 
the three core aspects of autism, at the genetic, neural and 
cognitive levels’ (p. 1219).
It is difficult to see why the same or even similar con-
siderations should apply to accounts that might posit a 
single (e.g. psychological) cause, on the one hand, and a 
single explanation, on the other (also Goodman, 1989; 
Wing and Wing, 1971). To repeat, it is perfectly plausible 
that one could offer a single explanation with multiple 
levels and alternative kinds of causation. Any account of 
pathogenesis is going to describe either one or several tra-
jectories in which at one stage what is caused, at the next 
developmental stage becomes a cause of further repercus-
sions. The crux is whether there are aetiological and/or 
pathogenic mechanisms that give coherence to autism as a 
syndrome.
The principal points made by Happé et al. (2006), and 
elaborated further by Happé and Ronald (2008), may be 
grouped under three headings, as follows.
Epidemiology and genetics
The evidence. Although there is a complex and somewhat 
conflicting body of epidemiological evidence (well reviewed 
by Happé and Ronald, 2008), here I shall focus on an inves-
tigation summarised by Happé et al. (2006). These research-
ers report a population-based study of what they call 
‘autistic-like traits’ among over 3000 twin pairs assessed 
between the ages of 7 and 9 years. They write, ‘We can ask, 
for example, whether a child joins in playing games with 
other children easily, can keep a two-way conversation 
going or likes to do things over and over again in the same 
way all the time’ (and see Ronald et al., 2005, for further 
examples of questionnaire items comprising descriptions of 
children, such as ‘considerate of other people’s feelings’, 
‘gets on better with adults than with other children’, and ‘is 
afraid in social situations’). The respondents were teachers 
and parents, and each item (10 on a social scale and 6 on a 
non-social scale) was rated ‘not true’, ‘somewhat true’ and 
‘certainly true’.
The authors (Happé et al., 2006: 1218) summarised their 
principal results as follows:
The distribution of such traits supports a smooth continuum (at 
least on the behavioural level) between individuals meeting 
diagnostic criteria for ASD and individuals in the general 
population.
Of the modest-to-low correlations between autistic-like 
behavioural traits in the three core areas, they wrote,
Somewhat to our surprise, even social and communication 
impairments, which are often seen as almost indistinguishable 
in real life and have been suggested to result from a single 
cognitive deficit, were only modestly related (with correlations 
(r) in the range of 0.2 to 0.4).
Indeed, this is surprising, given that from a conceptual 
as well as empirical standpoint, the interface between social 
interaction and communication is so porous. In addition, 
they report that ‘a considerable number of children showed 
isolated difficulties in only one area of the autistic triad’ (p. 
1218).
A second line of evidence concerns family studies of 
individuals with ASD, and again a quotation from Happé 
et al. (2006) serves as a succinct summary:
Family and twin studies have shown that it is not only autism 
itself that is heritable, but that relatives show increased rates of 
the ‘broader autism phenotype’, which refers to subclinical 
manifestations of all or part of the triad of autistic features. 
Importantly, some relatives show only isolated traits, for 
example communication difficulties without social impairment 
or rigidity. This suggests that the genes that contribute to 
autism segregate among relatives and have distinct influences 
on the different parts of the phenotype. (p. 1219)
How far do above lines of evidence warrant the conclu-
sion that autism is fractionable?
Methodological considerations.  In the case of the twin studies 
by Happé and colleagues, a critical question is this: What 
do the responses of parents or teachers to this kind of ques-
tionnaire mean? Is it justified to consider the measure to be 
one of ‘autistic-like traits’, or, as Ronald et al. (2005: 446) 
state when referring to high scores on the 10 items of the 
social scale, ‘autistic behaviours’? Imagine you were 
responding to the questions cited above, with reference to a 
7- to 9-year-old in your own family. For instance, suppose 
you considered it to be ‘certainly true’ that he/she is afraid 
in social situations’ – would you be capturing and convey-
ing something that relates to autism at all, when the child 
might have anxieties that differ not only in quality from 
those experienced by children with autism, but also in their 
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underlying causes? There are many, many reasons why a 
parent or teacher might classify a child in one or several of 
the categories that are supposed to correspond with putative 
‘autistic-like traits’.
In particular, given additional concerns about the mod-
est internal consistency and reliability of the measures 
within the domains studied in this research – concluding 
that X does not correlate with Y is hazardous if X does not 
correlate well with itself, for example (see critique by 
Mandy and Skuse, 2008) – it is questionable we learn much 
about autism from such data. The fact that there is not a 
bimodal distribution in the numbers that emerge may be 
telling us as much about the non-specificity of the measures 
as about the phenomena they are supposed to measure. The 
potential (albeit limited) strengths of this methodology in 
yielding conclusions about the severity of reported impair-
ments – and the authors stress that isolated difficulties 
‘appeared to be at a level of severity comparable to that 
found in children with diagnosed ASD in our sample’ 
(p. 1218 of Happé et al., 2006, author’s italics) – is offset 
by its insensitivity to the qualities of the children’s clinical 
features.
When we turn to consider the broader phenotype in rela-
tives of probands with autism, that is, relatives among 
whom potentially separate expressions of a propensity to 
autism may be discerned, the ‘autistic-like’ question crops 
up in a different way. But first, it is important to acknowl-
edge that the findings here may challenge an extreme ver-
sion of the coherence view. If, say, language impairments 
appear in relatives of probands with a diagnosis of ASD and 
these relatives show no other signs of psychological disor-
der, then clearly these language impairments are unlikely to 
result from other features of autism-related disorder.
There are two issues to be settled before this conclusion 
is justified. First, do the observed forms of impairment in 
each domain come close enough to those seen in autism, or 
do seeming similarities belie essential differences? Second, 
is it securely established that no other autism-related atypi-
calities are present in the relatives? If they were present in 
some form that eluded measurement, then clearly the inde-
pendence of features would be open to question.
If doubts over these matters are dispelled, then how far 
should one accept the evidence as suggesting that features 
of autism fractionate? Answer: some distance, but by no 
means the whole way. At most, one could conclude that in 
some families, there may be independent genetic contribu-
tions to different features of the syndrome. This leaves con-
siderable scope for additional pathogenic and pathoplastic 
influences to operate, contributing cause(s) of and giving 
shape to features of the syndrome as these occur together in 
probands. For example, mutual interactions among poten-
tially separable communicative and cognitive/linguistic 
disabilities might influence both the qualities and degrees 
of (say) pragmatic language impairment and/or repetitive 
behaviour among individuals with the full syndrome. If this 
were the case, then such interactive effects operating over 
the course of the children’s early development would con-
stitute a potent source of coherence. In addition, it would 
remain to establish how far one should generalise any con-
clusions to all cases of autism, in some of whom (as I shall 
discuss later) similar forms of impairment in language, 
social relations and repetitive behaviour appear to arise 
from causes very different to the genetic factors posited to 
underlie deficits identified as fractionable.
Cognitive approaches
Happé et al. (2006) highlight what they see as ‘a failure to 
find a single cognitive account for the three core features of 
autism’ (p. 1219). Happé and Ronald (2008) refer to the 
‘satisfactory working theories … for the various different 
aspects of autism’, namely, those that posit a specific ‘the-
ory of mind’ deficit, executive dysfunction and weak cen-
tral coherence (p. 297).
It is open to question quite how satisfactory these theo-
ries are. Importantly, for the present article, theory of mind 
theorising has been criticised for neglect of the role of 
embodied/interactional relatedness in characterising the 
foundations for mental state understanding and communi-
cation (e.g. Hobson, 1990, 1991). Accounts of limitations 
in central coherence or executive dysfunction are helpful 
from a descriptive viewpoint, but without detailed specifi-
cation of the source(s) and structure of these atypicalities as 
they apply to autism, one might question how far they ren-
der the pathogenesis of the syndrome intelligible in terms 
of processes that we understand better than the phenomena 
we are seeking to explain.
These matters become important in the light of the claim 
that the three satisfactory theoretical accounts map on to 
the three sets of dissociable features in autism. If an alterna-
tive kind of account of autism – one overlooked by investi-
gators espousing fractionation – were to prove even more 
satisfactory, then this might be congruent with a quite dif-
ferent pattern of associations and dissociations among clin-
ical features.
Neuroscience
Happé et al. (2006) take the view that neuroimaging studies 
offer support for the fractionable nature of autism. For 
instance, they note that imaging in healthy and ASD adult 
volunteers suggests that social cognition relies upon a spe-
cific network of brain regions including the medial frontal 
cortex, temporoparietal junction, superior temporal sulcus 
and temporal poles, whereas rigid and repetitive behaviour 
has been linked to caudate abnormality in ASD.
A single but critical consideration influences the weight 
to be accorded to current neurofunctional evidence in this 
context. Of course, in typically developing individuals well 
past infancy, different neural systems subserve different 
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domains of psychological functioning. Of course, too, such 
systems may be differentially affected among persons with 
autism. The problem is that as yet, little is known about the 
development of such specialised systems, and even less 
about their atypical development.
Brains develop in relation to the experience of the peo-
ple whose brains they are (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). 
There is good reason to think that from early in life, the 
experience of children with autism is severely atypical. It 
follows that whatever correlations between neural and psy-
chological function or dysfunction may be uncovered 
among children, adolescents or adults with autism, we can-
not know in which direction the causative arrows point. 
Has atypical experience at Time 1 (perhaps from dysfunc-
tion of brain system A, or perhaps from a variety of causes) 
led to atypical development in brain systems B and C at 
Time 2, or are primary dysfunctions in systems A, B and C 
responsible for the atypicalities we see at Time 2, or is some 
other set of interactions involved?
For instance, there is evidence that executive dysfunc-
tion is relatively late in onset among children with autism 
(e.g. Griffith et al., 1999). It is entirely plausible that this 
set of impairments (which incidentally, do not assume a 
profile characteristic of those cases on the basis of which 
the concept of ‘executive dysfunction’ was founded) 
might stem from disruption in other psychological func-
tions and result in atypical functioning in those areas of 
the brain known to mediate planning, working memory 
and so on.
Therefore, atypicalities in brain function may reflect, 
rather than underlie, atypicalities in psychological func-
tioning at any given point in time. Of course, the reverse 
may also be the case. In a developmental disorder of early 
onset, such as autism, we cannot decide the issue. Therefore, 
as presently constituted, research findings from neurofunc-
tional studies appear to count neither for nor against a frac-
tionation view of autism.
The case against radical 
incoherence
Epidemiology
As Happé and colleagues acknowledge, an important epi-
demiological study suggesting that autism is a syndrome 
was conducted by Wing and Gould (1979) in the former 
London borough of Camberwell. These researchers 
screened 35,000 children under the age of 15 years for the 
presence of at least one of the following items, regardless 
of level of intelligence: (a) absence or impairment of social 
interaction, especially with peers; (b) absence or impair-
ment of the development of verbal and non-verbal lan-
guage; and (c) repetitive, stereotyped activities of any kind. 
The one additional group included was that of ambulant 
children with severe intellectual disability, whatever their 
pattern of behaviour and impairments. These criteria 
resulted in the selection of 132 children. Professional work-
ers or parents involved with the children were interviewed 
with a structured schedule to assess the children’s behav-
ioural skills, and the children themselves were observed in 
the classroom or at home.
The overall prevalence of impairments in reciprocal 
social interaction was 21.2 per 10,000 of the population. All 
the children with social impairments had repetitive stereo-
typed behaviour, and almost all had absence or abnormali-
ties of language and symbolic activities. This led Wing to 
talk about the ‘autistic continuum’ of cases that manifest 
the triad of impairments in social interaction, communica-
tion and imagination, usually associated with a repetitive, 
stereotyped pattern of activities.
In a respectful critique of this study, Happé and Ronald 
(2008) point out that Wing and Gould used a narrow defini-
tion of autism. The sample was selected from a psychiatric 
and mental retardation register, and so might have been 
skewed towards children with more severe and/or co-morbid 
conditions. What is true of children with limited intellectual 
capacities may not be true of more able children with 
autism (Mandy and Skuse, 2008). Still one needs to account 
for the coherence of the syndrome as revealed by a study 
notable for the thoroughness with which qualities of the 
children’s impairments were assessed. So far, results from 
factor analytic studies (reviewed by Happé and Ronald, 
2008; Mandy and Skuse, 2008) have not been decisive in 
this respect.
Clinical and theoretical coherence
There are no a priori principles for dividing up the psycho-
logical domain for the purposes of explaining typical or 
atypical development. As Goodman (1989) and Wing and 
Wing (1971) indicated, there is much to be gained from 
examining in detail whether the phenomenology and clini-
cal features of autism, both within the syndrome and 
between autism and plausibly related conditions, appear to 
bear a close mutual relation. Such examination may uncover 
connections among features that had seemed disconnected. 
Having said this, the dangers of misjudging whether and in 
which respects features are similar – the spectre of pheno-
mimicry (Bishop, 2010; Williams et al., 2008) – attends this 
process every step of the way.
In part, empirical studies of coherence are informed by, as 
well as informing, theoretical perspectives. I now turn to a 
theoretical approach that accounts for substantial coherence 
in the phenomena of autism in terms of the developmental 
implications of restricted interpersonal relations (note: this is 
not a psychogenic theory). Subsequently, I shall illustrate the 
potential value of this approach for interpreting findings 
from studies of congenitally blind children.
The hypothesis is as follows. A ‘final common pathway’ 
accounts for substantial coherence in the presentation of 
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autism. This final common pathway is psychological in 
kind (rather than genetic, biochemical, neurological, etc.). 
More than this, it needs to be characterised in terms that are 
intersubjective rather than individual because it concerns 
breakdown in a system of self-in-relation-to-other. If one 
considers causative factors in the individual children 
affected, then these causes are several in nature. Yet they 
converge in causing a distinctive, shared social-develop-
mental handicap with a coherent set of developmental 
sequelae.
If this approach is valid, then one would expect both 
substantial homogeneity and underlying heterogeneity 
among people with autism. The homogeneity arises from 
the shared social-developmental handicap – in summary, 
limited engagement with other people’s engagement with a 
shared world – and its developmental implications. Much 
of the heterogeneity arises from additional, direct expres-
sions of the various aetiological and pathogenic sources of 
the social impairment. Shortly, I shall illustrate this princi-
ple of similarity-with-difference among children with 
autism through the special case of those who are congeni-
tally blind.
There is an additional source of heterogeneity among 
individual children with autism. As in the case of borderline 
personality disorder cited earlier, only some of a family of 
clinical features may be expressed in any one individual. 
For instance, some children with autism appear to be more 
adept than others in finding ways to compensate for limited 
role-taking abilities in their verbal communication. One 
implication for assessing coherence is that one needs to 
step back from an exclusive focus on the individual, and 
consider whether a set of theoretically interlinked clinical 
features cluster together and characterise a group of affected 
individuals, even when given individuals might differ in 
which particular subset of those features are manifest. If 
this seems paradoxical as an argument for coherence (one 
might ask, ‘How can a set of clinical features be coherent 
when one or more of those features might be missing?’), 
consider how the separable but coherently related symp-
toms of diabetes in the eye, heart or nervous system may or 
may not afflict a given individual with the disease. 
Importantly, however, that individual is vulnerable to the 
full set of physical complications, some of which may exist 
in subclinical form.
According to intersubjectivity theory and its more spe-
cific variant, Identification Theory (e.g. Hobson, 1993, 
2002, 2007), among individuals with autism, there is a 
common underlying structure to atypicalities in non-verbal 
and affective communication, linguistic functioning, imita-
tion, self-consciousness and other aspects of symbolic and 
social-cognitive functioning, including Theory of Mind. 
Shared developmental underpinnings in specific forms of 
restricted interpersonal experience mean that affected indi-
viduals are vulnerable to this coherent set of abnormalities. 
For instance, not only deficits in pragmatic language and 
dialogue but also ‘concrete’ modes of thinking among indi-
viduals with autism appear to be part and parcel of limita-
tions in individuals’ ability to register, engage with and 
adjust to another person’s perspective (e.g. Charney, 1981; 
Hobson, 2012; Hobson et al., 2012). From a developmental 
perspective, such role-taking appears to reflect something 
early in onset, namely a propensity to identify with another 
person’s bodily-expressed attitudes towards a shared, visu-
ally specified world. If movements in mental stance gener-
ated in the context of non-verbal communication between 
people can become movements in mental stance within an 
individual’s own mind – and if this is bound up with the 
achievement of self-reflective awareness and creative sym-
bolic functioning, as Mead (1934) and Werner and Kaplan 
(1963/1984) suggested – then deficits in basic forms of 
interpersonal engagement in autism may have far-reaching 
cognitive-developmental implications (Hobson et al., 
2006).
This Identification Theory is a ‘single’ theory of autism 
in two important senses, embodied in two related claims 
about what is basic to autism. The first claim is that any 
account of autism will need to include a level of explana-
tion that invokes breakdown in the intersubjective system 
of self-in-relation-to-other. If one fails to include such a 
level, then important features of autism will go unexplained 
and/or will appear to be independent of one another. The 
second claim is that impairments in intersubjective engage-
ment that include limitations in co-reference towards a 
shared world are universal to all cases of autism, early in 
onset, and constitute a major causative and/or shaping 
influence on the emergence of a range of other features of 
the disorder (also, for example, Mundy et al., 2009).
This theory is not ‘single’ in the sense that it explains 
everything about autism. As already argued, no single dys-
function could encompass everything relevant to causation. 
Diverse lower-order explanations, either domain-general or 
domain-specific, might account for the ways in which a 
child’s capacity for intersubjective engagement can be 
impaired. The approach allows for – indeed, anticipates that 
there are – multiple primary deficits across different chil-
dren, at lower levels of psychological explanation. As I shall 
illustrate through the case of blind children, alternative psy-
chological causes may operate from one case to another, 
and/or from one developmental stage to another. The causes 
may differ in kind (e.g. some might be neurological), and 
they will have their own distinctive effects in addition to 
those that prevent or disrupt critical forms of social experi-
ence. Importantly, therefore, the theoretical approach speci-
fies what leads to coherence in the syndrome of autism, 
while at the same time indicating where one should expect 
heterogeneity in aetiology and pathogenesis.
Like most theories, this one has strengths and weaknesses. 
For instance, when it comes to explaining limitations in self-
regulation and executive functioning (Hobson and Hobson, 
2011), it relies heavily on the theoretical position of Vygotsky 
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(1978), who considered that the interiorisation of interper-
sonal functioning ‘applies equally to voluntary attention, to 
logical memory, and to the formation of concepts’ (pp. 56–
57). As yet, there is little direct evidence for the suggestion 
that impairments in intersubjective engagement are responsi-
ble for weakness in top-down modulation of psychological 
function in autism, although there are intriguing pointers in 
this respect (Williams et al., 2012). So, too, there is limited 
evidence to support the idea that repetitive behaviour and/or 
insistence of sameness (Richler et al., 2010) arise from the 
absence of socially derived movements in thought and feel-
ing, together with defensive channelling of motivation and 
interest according to what the individual can control and 
manage (also Baron-Cohen, 1989; Rodgers et al., 2012).
Most important for the present purposes, however, is 
that if one conceives of the final common pathway to 
autism as disorder in interpersonal relations, then this radi-
cally alters one’s perspective not only on mechanisms of 
causation but also on coherence among clinical features of 
the syndrome and sources of heterogeneity across affected 
individuals.
Atypical autism
Suppose there are circumstances in which children present 
with the syndrome of autism, but in which some of the 
usual causal factors are replaced by new ones? Such atypi-
cal forms of autism might help us to gain fresh purchase on 
sources of coherence and/or incoherence in the disorder. 
Once again, one would need to determine whether the atyp-
ical form of autism is similar enough to more typical forms 
of autism to justify comparisons and contrasts, especially 
given that the conditions predisposing to autism are going 
to distinguish atypical from typical cases.
Here, I shall focus on the case of autism among congeni-
tally blind children. For the present purposes, the critical 
issues are as follows. First, does profound lack of vision 
from birth put a child at risk for developing the syndrome 
of autism? Second, do we find coherence in autism among 
blind children – and if so, why?
Early reports from clinicians working with blind chil-
dren (e.g. Fraiberg and Adelson, 1977; Wills, 1979a, 1979b) 
have been complemented by more recent studies in sug-
gesting that these children manifest a range of psychologi-
cal abnormalities that resemble those seen in sighted 
children with autism. This is the case in relation to social–
communicative functioning (Curson, 1979; Rowland, 
1983; Urwin, 1983), creative symbolic play and language 
(Andersen et al., 1984; Bishop et al., 2005; Dunlea, 1989; 
Hobson and Bishop, 2003; Preisler, 1993; Rogers and 
Puchalski, 1984), stereotypies, mannerisms and ritualistic 
behaviour (Chess, 1971; Wills, 1979a, 1979b), and uneven 
profiles of cognitive abilities, including difficulties with 
abstract thinking (Tillman, 1967; Wills, 1981; also Elonen 
and Cain, 1964; Green and Schecter, 1957). Either the 
whole or parts of the syndrome of autism have been reported 
for visually impaired children with specific medical diag-
noses, for example, retrolental fibroplasia (Keeler, 1958; 
also Chase, 1972), maternal rubella (Chess, 1971) and 
Leber’s amaurosis (Rogers and Newhart-Larson, 1989).
Brown et al. (1997) conducted systematic comparisons 
between congenitally blind children and sighted children 
with autism. These investigators selected 24 children from 
six schools for the blind on the basis that they were aged 
between 3 and 9 years and had total or near-total blindness 
from birth and an absence of manifest neurological impair-
ment. In all, 10 out of the 24 congenitally blind children 
satisfied  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Third Edition, Text Revision (DSM-III-R) crite-
ria for autism (also Fraiberg, 1977). The diagnosis was not 
restricted to any particular medical diagnosis. The sex dis-
tribution in the overall sample was 11 males and 13 females, 
and among the 10 children diagnosed with autism there 
were 4 males and 6 females.
It seemed unlikely that the findings reflected ‘co-
morbidity’ between two potentially separable conditions, 
blindness on the one hand and autism on the other. Not only 
was the sex distribution atypical, but clinical features such 
as echolalia, poor imaginative play and stereotyped body 
movements were distributed across the blind children, with 
and without the full syndrome of autism. Blind children 
without autism have also been reported to have limitations 
in Theory of Mind reasoning (McAlpine and Moore, 1995; 
Minter et al., 1998; Pring et al., 1998). It appears that lack 
of vision can lead to restricted social role-taking across a 
number of functional domains. This restriction explains the 
coherence of the constellation of clinical features that find 
most vivid and comprehensive – but not exclusive – expres-
sion among children with the full syndrome of autism. 
Elements of the constellation sometimes appear in relative 
isolation, but insofar as they may represent alternative 
modes of presentation of the self-same role-taking difficul-
ties and that arguably, the children are vulnerable to the full 
set of related features, this should not be taken as evidence 
for the fractionation hypothesis.
There remained a critical question: Are the clinical fea-
tures seen in blind children with the full syndrome of autism 
more or less like those of sighted children with autism in 
the qualities of clinical presentation? Hobson et al. (1999) 
constituted a new group of closely matched sighted children 
with autism, to compare with nine of the blind children with 
autism. All the children in each group satisfied DSM-III-R 
criteria for autism. There was substantial overlap, but also 
subtle differences, on systematic observational measures. 
For instance, there was a relatively high proportion of blind 
children rated as having postural oddities and motor stereo-
typies, abnormal personal pronoun usage, and immediate 
echolalia, but a relatively low proportion of the blind were 
abnormal in the variety and depth of affect and modulation 
of affect.
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Further evidence that (a) the source of the blind children’s 
autism was atypical and (b) the syndrome was coherent came 
from an 8-year follow-up study of these same children 
(Hobson and Lee, 2010). Overall, 8 out of the 9 blind chil-
dren now failed to meet formal diagnostic criteria for autism. 
However, the blind participants still displayed a range of 
clinical features such as echolalia, difficulties with personal 
pronouns, lack of awareness of the existence/feelings of oth-
ers, poor imaginative play, and stereotyped body movements 
and/or restricted patterns of interest. There was substantial 
coherence to the clinical picture even when its seriousness 
had diminished. Marked impairments in specific forms of 
social relatedness, language, and restricted and stereotyped 
forms of behaviour were prevalent among affected children.
Why should this be? There are at least two parts to this 
question. First, why should children who (probably) are not 
genetically predisposed to develop the various features of 
autism, nor (probably) afflicted by sufficiently specific pri-
mary neurological impairment, develop a clinical picture so 
close to that of autism in sighted children? Second, among 
those congenitally blind children who present with only 
parts of the clinical picture, whether because they are not so 
impaired from the outset or because they have partially 
‘recovered’ from autism, why do supposedly disparate fea-
tures still seem to cohere in the sense that they all find 
expression within the group as a whole?
The studies of congenitally blind children by Hobson 
and colleagues were prompted by a set of hypotheses gen-
erated from intersubjectivity/Identification Theory already 
described. The investigators considered sighted children 
with autism to have a weak propensity to identify with oth-
ers’ attitudes for a range of constitutional (‘biological’) 
reasons. They reasoned that because they lack sight, those 
with congenital blindness also suffer severe impediments 
to joint attention, social referencing and other forms of 
mental co-orientation with others vis-à-vis a visually spec-
ified world. Congenitally blind children, too, are at a dis-
advantage in grasping how objects and events can be 
construed differently by different individuals. Blind chil-
dren’s atypicalities in language, thought and play reflect 
this difficulty, for instance through their diminished appre-
ciation of speech roles (e.g. confusions between ‘I’ and 
‘you’) and novel person-anchored meanings attributed to 
the materials of play.
The obstacles to sharing and taking new perspectives 
through other people are not insurmountable, as the rela-
tively typical development of many blind children attests. 
Although blind children who develop autism may well be 
subject to additional constitutional and/or environmental 
disadvantages, it is plausible that many of their seemingly 
diverse clinical features are expressions of developmental 
sequelae to perceptually ground intersubjective handicaps. 
Restriction in experience of person–person–world co-ordi-
nation of perspectives is profoundly important for the 
development of blind and sighted children alike. In each 
group, this level of explanation accounts for substantial 
coherence in the clinical picture of autism.
This returns us to the question of whether we should 
consider autism among blind children as autism, or instead 
describe the children as ‘autistic-like’ or showing ‘quasi-
autistic features’ (Frith, 2003; Rutter et al., 1999). The 
problem with the latter formulation is that it leads us away 
from the diagnostic criteria for autism towards some other 
unspecified notion of ‘true’ autism. Sure enough, there are 
differences between congenital blind children with autism 
and sighted children with autism. This is precisely what one 
would expect if lack of vision is a risk factor peculiar to the 
former group. But is there a principled reason for arguing 
that, if their condition fulfils current diagnostic criteria, 
their autism is not true autism? Perhaps, instead, one needs 
to see that there is an open question over the degree of het-
erogeneity among all children who present with the syn-
drome. This is a matter that has special importance when 
considering the potential for influencing affected individu-
als’ developmental trajectories.
There is a related hazard attached to calling isolated or 
co-occurring clinical features ‘autistic-like’, whether these 
occur among blind or other children. This stance implies 
that autism is the reference point for understanding. A more 
balanced position would be this: insofar as certain clinical 
features are truly common to many congenitally blind chil-
dren (as well as some children who have suffered especially 
severe privation: e.g. Rutter et al., 2007, also Livermore-
Hardy et al., 2013) and those we classify as having autism, 
then these features should be considered in relation to path-
ogenic factors shared in the emergence and expression of 
the features. The latter perspective respects coherence 
among clinical features – a coherence that reflects underly-
ing pathogenesis, that is, what is common in how the fea-
tures develop in mutual relation to one another – while 
allowing variability among different individuals in aetiol-
ogy, in preliminary phases of their developmental trajec-
tory, in which features they manifest, and in how their 
natural history unfolds. After all, at follow-up, the blind 
children studied by Hobson and Lee (2010) showed some, 
but only some, of the clinical features of autism they had 
shown 8 years previously.
In summary, the evidence strongly suggests that there is 
more than surface similarity between clinical features of 
autism among sighted and congenitally blind children (also 
Hobson, 2005). The differences in some details of the clini-
cal picture, the (probable) differences in sex ratio and the 
differences in natural history suggest that blindness per se 
may be acting as a risk factor. Although a matter requiring 
further study, it seems that other potential predisposing 
(e.g. genetic) factors probably play a lesser role in the gen-
esis of the syndrome.
And yet, autism among congenitally blind children has 
coherence. It is not just that the qualities of nearly all the 
features of the syndrome are similar to those seen among 
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sighted children with autism. It is also that the range of 
features – social, communicative and repetitive and ritual-
istic – are represented. This coherence is in keeping with 
what had been anticipated on the basis of a theory focussed 
on the developmental implications of disruptions to the 
children’s interpersonal functioning – a single but multi-
level theory.
Conclusion
There is no simple answer to the question: Is the syn-
drome of autism coherent or fractionable? Yet this is a 
question well worth asking, whether one is concerned 
with conducting research (and wishing to constitute 
meaningful groups that have relevant kinds of within-
group homogeneity), establishing diagnostic criteria, 
assessing genetic or other biological contributions to cau-
sation, developing psychological theories, tracing the 
natural history of affected children, or implementing 
intervention programmes. A lot is at stake. For instance, 
the fractionation view could encourage interventions that 
address fragments of the clinical picture, whereas the 
coherence view might lead one to focus instead on reme-
diating a final common pathway (perhaps what happens 
between affected children and others) that leads to the 
syndrome being constituted as it is.
Therefore, we need to be clear in discriminating among 
the various ways in which autism may be fractionable on 
the one hand, and coherent on the other. Within the frame-
work of genetics, for example, the evidence from the 
broader autism phenotype suggests that there is some frac-
tionation of genetic risk for different features of the disor-
der. On the other hand, there are grounds for positing 
psychological factors that bear upon the development and 
clinical presentation of the set of atypicalities characteristic 
of autism. It is too soon to reject the idea that causative 
psychological factors shared among different clinical fea-
tures, or mutual influences that give shape to the clinical 
phenomena, bring coherence to the picture of autism.
Acknowledgements
I give sincere thanks to Dr David Williams for his encouragement 
and detailed advice. I am grateful to the Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, and the Tavistock and 
Portman NHS Foundation Trust, London, for supporting a sab-
batical during which the article was written.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency 
in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
References
Andersen ES, Dunlea A and Kekelis LS (1984) Blind children’s 
language: resolving some differences. Journal of Child 
Language 11: 645–664.
Baron-Cohen S (1989) Do autistic children have obsessions and 
compulsions?  British Journal of Clinical Psychology 28: 
193–200.
Bishop DVM (2010) Overlaps between autism and language 
impairment: phenomimicry or shared etiology? Behavior 
Genetics 40: 618–629.
Bishop M, Hobson RP and Lee A (2005) Symbolic play in con-
genitally blind children. Development and Psychopathology 
17: 447–465.
Brambring M (2011) Response to Hobson’s letter: congenital 
blindness and autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 41: 1595–1597.
Brown R, Hobson RP, Lee A, et al. (1997) Are there ‘autistic-
like’ features in congenitally blind children? Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry 38: 693–703.
Charney R (1981) Pronoun errors in autistic children: support 
for a social explanation. British Journal of Disorders of 
Communication 15: 39–43.
Chase JB (1972) Retrolental Fibroplasia and Autistic 
Symptomatology. New York: American Foundation for the 
Blind.
Chess S (1971) Autism in children with congenital rubella. 
Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 1: 33–47.
Curson A (1979) The blind nursery school child. Psychoanalytic 
Study of the Child 34: 51–83.
Dunlea A (1989) Vision and the Emergence of Meaning. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elonen AS and Cain AC (1964) Diagnostic evaluation and 
treatment of deviant blind children. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 34: 625–633.
Fraiberg S (1977) Insights from the Blind. London: Souvenir 
Press.
Fraiberg S and Adelson E (1977) Self-representation in language 
and play. In: Fraiberg S (ed.) Insights from the Blind. London: 
Souvenir Press, pp. 248–270.
Frith U (2003) Autism: Explaining the Enigma. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Goodman R (1989) Infantile autism: a syndrome of multiple 
primary deficits? Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 19: 409–424.
Green MR and Schecter DE (1957) Autistic and symbiotic disor-
ders in three blind children. Psychiatric Quarterly 31: 628–
646.
Griffith EM, Pennington BF, Wehner EA, et al. (1999) Executive 
functions in young children with autism. Child Development 
70: 817–832.
Happé F and Ronald A (2008) The ‘fractionable autism triad’: a 
review of evidence from behavioural, genetic, cognitive and 
neural research. Neuropsychology Review 18: 287–304.
Happé F, Ronald A and Plomin R (2006) Time to give up on a 
single explanation for autism. Nature Neuroscience 9: 1218–
1220.
Hobson RP (1990) On acquiring knowledge about people and the 
capacity to pretend: response to Leslie. Psychological Review 
97: 114–121.
Hobson RP (1991) Against the theory of ‘Theory of Mind’. British 
Journal of Developmental Psychology 9: 33–51.
Hobson RP (1993) Autism and the Development of Mind. Hove: 
Erlbaum.
Hobson RP (2002) The Cradle of Thought. London: Macmillan.
 at University College London on June 25, 2015 aut.sagepub.com Downloaded from Hobson  15
Hobson RP (2005) Why connect? On the relation between blind-
ness and autism. In: Pring L (ed.) Autism and Blindness. 
London: Whurr, pp. 10–25.
Hobson RP (2007) Communicative depth: soundings from devel-
opmental psychopathology. Infant Behavior & Development 
30: 267–277.
Hobson RP (2012) Autism, literal language, and concrete think-
ing: some developmental considerations. Metaphor and 
Symbol 27: 4–21.
Hobson RP and Bishop M (2003) The pathogenesis of 
autism: insights from congenital blindness. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 358: 
335–344.
Hobson RP and Hobson JA (2011) Cognitive flexibility in autism: 
a social-developmental account. In: Roth I and Rezaie P (eds) 
Researching the Autism Spectrum. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 266–283.
Hobson RP and Lee A (2010) Reversible autism among con-
genitally blind children? Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry 51: 1235–1241.
Hobson RP, Chidambi G, Lee A, et al. (2006) Foundations for 
self-awareness: an exploration through autism. Monographs 
of the Society for Research in Child Development 71: 1–165.
Hobson RP, Hobson JA, García-Pérez R, et al. (2012) Dialogic 
linkage and resonance in autism. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 42: 2718–2728.
Hobson RP, Lee A and Brown R (1999) Autism and congenital 
blindness. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
29: 45–56.
Kanner L (1943) Autistic disturbances of affective contact. 
Nervous Child 2: 217–250.
Karmiloff-Smith A (1998) Development itself is the key to 
understanding developmental disorders. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 2: 389–398.
Keeler WR (1958) Autistic patterns and defective communica-
tion in blind children with retrolental fibroplasia. In: Hoch PH 
and Zubin J (eds) Psychopathology of Communication. New 
York: Grune & Stratton, pp. 64–83.
Livermore-Hardy V, Skuse DH, DeJong M, et al. (2013) Autistic 
features observed in young people who have experienced 
early maltreatment – examining ‘quasi-autism’. Poster pres-
entation, International Meeting for Autism Research, San 
Sebastián, Spain, 4 May.
McAlpine LM and Moore C (1995) The development of social 
understanding in children with visual impairments. Journal of 
Visual Impairment & Blindness 89: 349–358.
Mandy WPL and Skuse DH (2008) Research review: what 
is the association between the social-communication ele-
ment of autism and repetitive interests, behaviours and 
activities?  Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
49: 795–808.
Mead GH (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, IL and London: 
University of Chicago Press.
Minter ME, Hobson RP and Bishop M (1998) Congenital vis-
ual impairment and ‘theory of mind’. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology 16: 183–196.
Mundy P, Sullivan L and Mastergeorge A (2009) A parallel and 
distributed processing model of joint attention and autism. 
Autism Research 2: 2–21.
Perez-Pereira M and Conti-Ramsden G (2005) Do blind children 
show autistic features? In: Pring L (ed.) Autism and Blindness. 
London: Whurr, pp. 99–127.
Preisler GM (1993) A descriptive study of blind children in 
nurseries with sighted children. Child: Care, Health and 
Development 19: 295–315.
Pring L, Dewart H and Brockbak M (1998) Social cogni-
tion in children with visual impairments. Journal of Visual 
Impairment & Blindness 92: 754–768.
Richler J, Huerta M, Bishop SL, et al. (2010) Developmental tra-
jectories of restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests in 
children with autism spectrum disorders. Development and 
Psychopathology 22: 55–69.
Rodgers J, Glod M, Connolly B, et al. (2012) The relationship 
between anxiety and repetitive behaviours in autism spectrum 
disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 42: 
2404–2409.
Rogers SJ and Newhart-Larson S (1989) Characteristics of 
infantile autism in five children with Leber’s congenital 
amaurosis. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 
31: 598–608.
Rogers SJ and Puchalski CB (1984) Development of symbolic 
play in visually impaired young children. Topics in Early 
Childhood Special Education 3: 57–63.
Ronald A, Happé F and Plomin R (2005) The genetic relation-
ship between individual differences in social and non-social 
behaviours characteristic of autism. Developmental Science 
8: 444–458.
Rowland C (1983) Patterns of interaction between three blind 
infants and their mothers. In: Mills AE (ed.) Language 
Acquisition in the Blind Child: Normal and Deficient. London: 
Croom Helm, pp. 114–132.
Rutter M,  Andersen-Wood L, Beckett C, et al. (1999) Quasi-
autistic patterns following severe early global privation. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 40: 537–549.
Rutter M, Kreppner J, Croft C, et al. (2007) Early adolescent out-
comes of institutionally deprived and non-deprived adoptees. 
III. Quasi-autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
48: 1200–1207.
Tillman MH (1967) The performance of blind and sighted chil-
dren on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children: study 
II. International Journal for the Education of the Blind 16: 
106–112.
Urwin C (1983) Dialogue and cognitive functioning in the early 
language development of three blind children. In: Mills AE 
(ed.) Language Acquisition in the Blind Child: Normal and 
Deficient. London: Croom Helm, pp. 142–161.
Vygotsky LS (1978) Internalization of higher psychological func-
tions. In: Cole M, John-Steiner V, Scribner S, et al. (eds) 
Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological 
Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 
52–57.
Werner H and Kaplan B (1963/1984) Symbol Formation. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Williams D, Botting N and Boucher J (2008) Language in autism 
and specific language impairment: where are the links? 
Psychological Bulletin 134: 944–963.
Williams DM, Bowler DM and Jarrold C (2012) Inner speech 
is used to mediate short-term memory, but not planning, 
 at University College London on June 25, 2015 aut.sagepub.com Downloaded from 16  Autism 18(1)
among intellectually high-functioning adults with autism 
spectrum disorder. Development and Psychopathology 24: 
225–239.
Wills DM (1979a) Early speech development in blind children. 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 34: 85–117.
Wills DM (1979b) ‘The ordinary devoted mother’ and her blind 
baby. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 34: 31–49.
Wills DM (1981) Some notes on the application of the diagnostic 
profile to young blind children. Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Child 36: 217–237.
Wing L (1969) The handicaps of autistic children – a compara-
tive study. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 10: 
1–40.
Wing L and Gould J (1979) Severe impairments of social inter-
action and associated abnormalities in children: epidemiol-
ogy and classification. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 9: 11–29.
Wing L and Wing JK (1971) Multiple impairments in early child-
hood autism. Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 
1: 256–266.
 at University College London on June 25, 2015 aut.sagepub.com Downloaded from 